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1 Introduction 
This report provides detail on the modelling and scenario frameworks for the economic 
analysis of the Future Grid. These frameworks and modelling platforms have been 
constructed to support the Future Grid Cluster in examining policy and market issues which 
will affect the electricity and natural gas markets in Australia.  
Initially we provide an overview of the co-optimisation and expansion of transmission 
networks and electricity generation for the future grid. In this section we outline not only the 
key mechanisms and analyses required, but also how we have and will continue to 
collaborate with the other projects within the Future Grid Cluster.  
In section 3 we provide an extensive analysis of the electricity market modelling platform 
PLEXOS. This section will outline, not only the mechanistic components of modelling 
electricity markets, but also some of the assumptions which are required to examine issues 
such as generation investment under uncertainty.  
The following section is a discussion of the natural gas modelling platform ATESHGAH. 
This model has been in construction for several years prior to the commencement of the 
Future Grid Cluster and represents a significant shift in gas market modelling methodology 
for Australia, compared to previous approaches. This model is capable of examining multiple 
issues associated with policy, market, economic, and physical aspects of gas production, 
transmission, sale and liquefied natural gas (LNG) export simultaneously. We have used this 
model to examine how Australia’s eastern gas market could be affected by the 
commencement of LNG exports from Curtis Island in 2015/16. 
In the remaining section, we present the scenario modelling framework as an overview and 
present some initial results for Scenario 1: Set and Forget. These results represent the first set 
of simulations and should thus be viewed as an initial attempt to undertake the large search 
space that the four scenarios evaluated in the Future Grid Forum encompass.  
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2 Co-optimisation and Expansion of transmission networks and 
electricity generation for the Future Grid 
 
The expansion of energy systems and its planning aims to address the problem of expanding 
and augmenting electricity and natural gas infrastructure, while serving growing demand and 
fulfilling a variety of technical, economic and policy constraints. Previously, the majority of 
the energy system had been characterised by vertical integration, which allowed for the 
optimal least-cost expansion subject to reliability and system constraints.  
Since the implementation of market liberalisation [1-3], and the deregulation of the previous 
vertically integrated supply chain into a number of horizontal components [4], there have 
been a number of conflicting planning objectives which include: 
1. The promotion of competition amongst electricity market participants by the 
implementation of an aggregated spot market pool [5, 6]: 
 The maximization of social welfare now occurs in a market based 
environment (i.e. the pool based market mechanisms [7, 8] and bilateral 
contracts) 
 Market participants can hedge risk via forward contract markets (contracts for 
difference) which lower the probability of wholesale energy price spikes 
affecting consumers [9] 
 These market features provide non-discriminatory access to the lowest cost 
generation sources for all consumers connected to the main grid [10]. 
 
2. Facilitation of the early adoption of more efficient and lower cost generation 
technology types [11]: 
 Enhances the proliferation of generation assets which have a higher level of 
operational flexibility [12] 
 The development of advanced technology such as Ultra-Super Critical Coal 
fired power stations [13]. 
 
3. Promoting the deployment and integration of renewable energy sources such as wind 
and solar [14], which will lead to: 
 Mitigation of carbon emissions from the stationary energy sector [15] 
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 Diversification of fuel sources [16, 17]. 
 
4. Encouraging demand side participation via: 
 Demand side management (DSM) [18, 19] 
 Distributed Generation (DG) [20] 
 Localisation of Storage [21, 22]. 
 
5. Constructing a robust and resilient physical electricity network which can adapt to and 
enable processes which will: 
 Ensure that the occurrence of network congestion remains low [23, 24] 
 Reduce transmission losses 
 Provide fair and adequate supply-side and demand-side reserves for all economic 
agents in the system (for supply-side agents [25, 26] and demand-side agents [27, 
28]) 
 Promote resilience to uncertainties such as weather-related extreme events [29] 
 Fairly price consumer security of supply requirements based on actual risks [30], 
rather than via fault-tolerant risk criterion values [31].  
The deregulation and vertical restructuring of the power sector may lead to a significant 
increase in the uncertainties and risk that central planner’s face when trying to maintain 
adequacy of the energy system. Furthermore, this increase in risk and uncertainty may 
decrease the potential options available to policy makers [32]. We now briefly outline the 
uncertainties for power system planning in the future grid, which can be categorised into two 
main elements: 
1. Random uncertainties [33] 
 Demand (load)  
 Generation costs 
 Bidding behaviour of generating units 
 Availability of transmission capacity 
 Generation asset availability 
 Production from renewable energy sources. 
2. Non-random uncertainties [34-36] 
 Generation investment and retirement 
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 Load expansion and removal 
 Transmission network augmentation 
 Market rules and regulatory processes 
 Fuel costs and availability 
 Inflation or interest rates 
 Environmental regulation 
 Public Perception 
 The dynamics of other energy and financial markets. 
This project utilizing its gas and electricity market modelling platforms (outlined in Sections 
3 and 4) has the capability to examine gas scheduling and its influence on outputs of both the 
gas and power sectors. Furthermore, this combined modelling approach has the potential to 
integrate gas market operations into system adequacy questions which relate to power system 
reliability. 
This project however, will not examine the effects of contracts, be they short- or long-term on 
the natural gas market. It is likely that long-term contracts will be priced at the expected 
value of long-term production costs with an added risk premium. However, we briefly 
mention how our analysis could take into account gas market contracts and operations. 
Medium- to long-term gas market scheduling is executed somewhat in accordance with gas 
supply contracts.  
In general terms, there are usually four types of gas supply contracts which warrant 
discussion: long-term contracts; fixed delivery of volume and timing; flexible delivery of 
volume and timing, and; the Take-or-Pay (ToP) contract arrangement. While supplementary 
to bilateral over-the-counter arrangements, transactions on the gas spot market are mainly to 
offset quantity deviations [37] and provide market liquidity and an indexed price for long-
term contracts.  
To remain competitive, the majority of Open Cycle Gas Turbines (OCGT) require the use of 
the more flexible and ToP type gas contracts. This reflects the price of these contract types 
are typically below the other contract types previously mentioned. Thus, a consequence of 
these types of contracting is that during periods of gas market infrastructure and supply 
disruptions, gas-fired powered generation (GPG) of all types are likely to be curtailed first. 
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Furthermore, from a market operations perspective, non-electricity/LNG based consumers 
(such as residential customers) should have a higher positioning on the schedule for dispatch. 
This project has the capability to examine the prospect of insufficient gas supplies and how 
this may compromise the power outputs of GPG units which may jeopardize the reliability of 
the power system. Thus, gas transmission limits should also be taken into account when 
examining the electricity generation capacity of GPG units as well as the possible shifts in 
gas supply due to system curtailment and gas system operations. 
In collaboration with the Universities of Newcastle and Sydney, our co-planning objective is 
to maximize the overall social welfare function of consumers and to minimize total network 
expansion and generation capacity costs.  
In collaboration with Projects 1 and 2, our goal is to establish an integrated natural gas and 
electricity market suite of constraints to understand system operational limits. The 
fundamental constraints are transmission and supply constraints that involve the 
combinations of generation/production, demand and line/pipeline flow. The transmission 
constraints refer to technical limits for both gas pipelines and power lines. The supply 
constraints refer to both gas production fields and power generators. 
2.1 Collaboration with Projects 1 and 2 
There are two ways in which Project 3’s database can be used: 1) some scenarios proposed by 
P3 will be incorporated into P1 and P2 models, such as carbon prices, renewable energy 
certificate prices forecast, fuel prices, etc. ;2) the gas price forecast, which can be considered 
as gas production costs by basin/node. Next, a central gas dispatch scheme is performed 
based on those costs of gas providers. Then we simulate gas prices in spot markets (bidding 
to provide gas) to better inform the cluster of prevailing fuel price conditions. More 
specifically, gas prices in Project 3's models will be gas production costs in models of P2. 
This is due to the modelling platforms design purpose which is to provide gas prices from P2 
models which are simulation results/outputs, reflecting gas demands as well as the market 
interactions between gas and power markets. 
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3 Electricity Market Simulation Platform. 
 
Modelling the National Electricity Market (NEM) has been conducted using a commercially 
available electricity market simulation platform known as PLEXOS [38] provided by Energy 
Exemplar. The core implementation of optimisation algorithms which drive this software 
platform are primarily Linear Programming (LP), Non-Linear Programming (NLP), Mixed 
Integer Programming (MIP), Quadratic Programming (QP), and Quadratic Constraint 
Programming (QCP). Furthermore, the platform requires a number of
 
third party industrial 
solvers such as Gurobi, CPLEX and MOSEK to perform the transmission and generation 
expansion planning. 
PLEXOS utilizes these solvers in combination with an extensive input database of regional 
demand forecasts, transmission thermal line limits and generation plant specifications to 
produce price, generator behavioural characteristics (bidding behaviour) and demand 
forecasts to replicate the NEM dispatch engine (NEMDE, formerly SPD (scheduling, pricing 
and dispatch)) which is used by the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) to operate 
the market.  
PLEXOS is a mature, and well respected modelling package and which is currently in use in 
similar modelling-related research, including modelling the impact of electric vehicles on 
Ireland’s electricity market [39, 40]. Furthermore, PLEXOS can provide a highly accurate 
prediction of prices and has been used to model market behaviour following the introduction 
of carbon prices [41]. 
PLEXOS’ least cost expansion algorithm and planning tools, as used in this study and by 
AEMO [42], provides the optimal generation capacity mix given the current and forecasted 
policy constraints [12, 43, 44]. 
Project 3 has specifically chosen PLEXOS as the key modelling platform for the Future Grid 
Cluster given our previous research in modelling the future electricity grid and the 
competitiveness of Australia’s electricity sector [45-47], and the platform is populated with 
Australia’s NEM data [42, 48, 49] to enable robust modelling of the NEM. 
In this project report, we now provide a short overview of the methodologies that PLEXOS 
uses to simulate the electricity market and to evaluate its optimal expansion. The reader 
should note however, the full description of the algorithmic development and methods that 
PLEXOS employs are subject to commercial-in-confidence agreements. 
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PLEXOS breaks down the simulation of the NEM into a number of phases which range in 
scope and scale. These time-scales range from: year-long generation expansion planning and 
constraint evaluation; security and systematic supply requirements; network expansion down 
to hourly dispatch and market clearing. Although PLEXOS has the capability to perform  
five-minute dispatch we will follow the method used by the Future Grid Forum [50] and 
AEMO’s National Transmission and  Network Development Plan [42], which both use 
hourly dispatch periods. This particular time scale is most useful in simulating long-term 
electricity market structural behaviour patterns and in an effort to reduce the computational 
requirements of this study. The operation and the interaction between these modelling phases 
is shown in Figure 1. We shall now explore briefly the operational aspects of PLEXOS and 
the methodologies it employs to simulate the electricity market.  
 
Figure 1: PLEXOS Simulation Core 
3.1 Optimal Power Flow Solution 
The solution to the optimal power flow (OPF), is one of the core functions of the PLEXOS 
simulation engine which utilizes a linearized version of the direct current (DC) approximation 
for the optimal power flow problem to model transmission congestion and marginal thermal 
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losses. In PLEXOS the locational marginal prices (LMP) are reflective of transmission 
marginal loss factors as well as congestion throughout the system. Further, the congestion 
modelling results are also an indicator of long-term constrains within sub-branch loops (such 
as the Tarong loop in Queensland), which may require capacity upgrades in the future. 
However, PLEXOS does not perform any pre-computation or impose any restrictions on how 
dynamic the network data may be, thus it can model transmission augmentations and 
transmission outages dynamically. PLEXOS thus optimizes the power flows using a 
linearized DC approximation to the AC power flow equations. This model is completely 
integrated into the mathematical programming framework that results in the realistic 
simulation of generator dispatch, transmission power flows and regional reference pricing 
which are jointly optimized with the power flow solution. 
3.2 LT Plan 
The long-term (LT) planning phase of the PLEXOS model establishes the optimal 
combination of new entrant generation plant, economic retirements, and transmission 
upgrades which will minimize the net present value (NPV) of the total costs of the system 
over the planning horizon (as detailed in Figure 2). The following types of 
expansions/retirements and other planning features are supported within the LT Plan: 
 
 Building new generation assets (including multi-stage projects) 
 Retiring existing generation plant 
 Upgrading the capacity of existing transmission lines 
 New build transmission line infrastructure (including multi-stage projects). 
 
Furthermore, the PLEXOS least cost expansion planning phase also allows the tactful 
inclusion of global and domestic policy drivers into its input data set. While the scenario 
development capability of PLEXOS is an important issue into its operation, the 
parametrization and input is user-defined and labour intensive.  
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Figure 2: PLEXOS Least Cost Expansion Modelling Framework 
3.3 PASA 
The Projected Assessment of System Adequacy (PASA) schedules maintenance events such 
that the optimal generation capacity is available and distributed suitably across 
interconnected regions. The PASA phase of the model allocates/samples discrete and 
distributed maintenance timings and random forced outage patterns for generators and 
transmission lines. This ability to sample forced and planned outage patterns allows for 
uncertainty in generation plant availability and informs the LT Plan expansion phase of the 
model of further capacity requirements. 
3.4 MT Schedule 
The Medium Term (MT) Schedule is a model based on Load Duration Curves (LDC) (also 
known as load blocks), that can run on daily, weekly or monthly resolutions which includes a 
full representation of the power system and major constraint equations, but without the 
complexity of individual unit commitment. The MT Schedule models constraint equations 
including those that span several weeks, or months of a year. These constraints may include: 
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 Fuel off-take commitments (i.e. gas take-or-pay contracts) 
 Energy limits 
 Long term storage management taking into account inflow uncertainty 
 Emissions abatement pathways. 
 
Each constraint is optimized over its original timeframe and the MT to ST Schedule’s bridge 
algorithm converts the solution obtained (e.g. a storage trajectory) to targets or allocations for 
use in the shorter step of the ST Schedule. The LDC blocks are designed with more detailed 
information concerning peak and off-peak load times and less on average load conditions, 
thus preserving some of the original volatility.  
 
The solver/s used by PLEXOS will then schedule generation to meet the load and clear offers 
and bids inside these discrete blocks. System constraints are then applied, except those that 
define unit commitment and other inter-temporal constraints that imply a chronological 
relationship between LDC block intervals. The LDC component of the MT Schedule 
maintains consistency of inter-regional load profiles which ensures the coincident peaks 
within the simulation timeframe are captured. This method is able to simulate over long time 
horizons and large systems in a very short time frame. Its forecast can be used as a stand-
alone result or as the input to the full chronological simulation ST Schedule. 
 
3.5 ST Schedule and Spot Market Dispatch 
The Short Term (ST) Schedule is a fully featured, chronological unit commitment model, 
which solves the actual market interval time steps and is based on mixed inter programming. 
The ST Schedule generally executes in daily steps and receives information from the MT 
Schedule which allows PLEXOS to correctly handle long run constraints over this shorter 
time frame. 
PLEXOS models the electricity market central dispatch and pricing for each state on the 
NEM via Regional Reference Nodes (RRN). This is achieved by determining which power 
stations are to be included for each dispatch interval in order to satisfy forecasted demand.  
To adequately supply consumer demand, PLEXOS examines which generators are currently 
bid into the market as being available to generate for the market at that interval. This 
centralised dispatch algorithm uses the LP dispatch algorithm SPD to determine which 
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generators in the dispatch set in the given trading interval, taking into account the physical 
transmission network losses and constraints can serve load. 
Each day consists of 24 hour trading periods, and market scheduled generation assets have 
the option to make a supply offer for a given volume (MW) of electricity at a specified price 
($/MWh) across 10 bid bands. Each band, consists of bid price/quantity pairs which are then 
included into the nodal bid stack. 
Following the assembly of the generator bid pairs for each bid band, the LP algorithm begins 
with the least cost generator and stacks the generators in increasing order of their offer pairs 
at the node, while taking into account the transmission losses. The LP algorithm then 
dispatches generators/power stations in merit order, from the least cost to the highest cost 
until it dispatches sufficient generation to supply the forecasted demand with respect to the 
inter-regional losses. This methodology replicates not only the NEM dispatch process but is 
similar in construction to the least cost “Dutch Auction” [51, 52].  
The price of the marginal generating unit at each time interval determines the marginal price 
of electricity at the RRN for that given trading period. It should also be noted that this 
dispatch process and the ST Schedule have the following properties: 
 The dispatch algorithm calculates separate dispatch and markets prices for each node 
and then for the Regional Reference Price for each state of the NEM 
 Generator offer pairs determine the merit order for dispatch which and are adjusted 
with respect to relevant marginal loss factors 
 The market clearing price is the marginal price, not the average price of all dispatched 
generation (as per the “Dutch Auction” market design [53, 54]). 
 Price differences across regions are calculated using inter-regional loss factor 
equations as outlined by AEMO [42, 49]. 
PLEXOS can produce market forecasts, by taking advantage of one of the following three 
generator bidding behavioural models for cost recovery and market behaviour methodologies: 
 Short Run Marginal Cost Recovery (SRMC, also known as economic dispatch) 
 User defined market bids for every plant in the system 
 Long Run Marginal Cost Recovery (LRMC). 
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3.6 Short Run Marginal Cost Recovery Algorithm 
The core capability of any electricity market model is to perform the economic dispatch or 
Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC) recovery based simulations of generating units across a 
network to meet demand at least cost. PLEXOS’ platform performs economic dispatch under 
perfect competition where generators are assumed to bid faithfully their SRMC into the 
market. While simulations such as these will never result in a price trace which would match 
historical market data from an observed competitive market, they provide a lower bound 
representative of a pure competitive market. 
3.7 Long Run Marginal Cost Recovery 
PLEXOS has implemented a heuristic Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) recovery algorithm 
that develops a bidding strategy for each generating portfolio such that it can recover the 
LRMC for all its power stations. This price modification is dynamic and designed to be 
consistent with the goal of recovering fixed costs across an annual time period. The cost 
recovery algorithm runs across each MT Scheduled time step. The key steps of this algorithm 
are as follows: 
1. The MT Schedule is run with ‘default’ pricing (i.e. SRMC offers for each generating 
units) 
2. For each firm (company), calculate total annual net profit and record the pool revenue 
in each simulation block of the LDC 
3. Notionally allocate any net loss to simulation periods using the profile of pool 
revenue (i.e. periods with highest pool revenue are notionally allocated a higher share 
of the annual company net loss) 
4. Within each simulation block, calculate the premium that each generator inside each 
firm should charge to recover the amount of loss allocated to that period and that firm 
equal to the net loss allocation divided by the total generation in that period – which is 
referred to as the ‘base premium’ 
5. Calculate the final premium charged by each generator in each firm as a function of 
the base premium and a measure how close the generator is to the margin for pricing 
(i.e. marginal or extra marginal generators charge the full premium, while infra-
marginal generators charge a reduced premium) 
6. Re-run the MT Schedule dispatch and pricing with these new premium values 
7. If the ST Schedule is also run, then the MT Schedule solution is used to apply short-
term revenue requirements for each step of the ST Schedule and the same recovery 
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method is run at each step. Thus, the ST Schedule accounts for medium-term 
profitability objectives while solving in short steps. 
In using PLEXOS, this project has set the LRMC recovery algorithm to run three times for 
each time step to produce price trace forecasts with sufficient volatility and shape as 
recommended by the software’s vendor, Energy Exemplar. This will ensure that under 
normal demand conditions, generating units will bid effectively to replicate market conditions 
as seen in the NEM. It should be noted that the actual dispatch algorithm in this process is 
still an LP based protocol which is in contrast to other commercial tools that use much slower 
heuristic rule based algorithms to solve for LRMC recovery.  
 
3.8 Data and assumptions 
At the time of initiating this modelling the only publicly available PLEXOS data set that is 
available is AEMO’s NTNDP 2014 [42]. However, this database requires significant 
upgrading/repurposing so the database developed for this project was developed using the 
NTNDP dataset and other publicly available data. Prior to this project a former database to 
the NTNDP was used to model wholesale market behaviour in other related research such as: 
the deployment of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles [55], distributed generation [20] and the 
competitiveness of renewables [46]. The data and assumptions used to populate the database 
have been developed such that the completed database includes the following details: 
 Capacity factors (%) 
 Ramp rates (MW/min) 
 Emissions intensity factors (kg-CO2/MWh) 
 Fuel costs ($/GJ) for coal, oil, distillate and natural gas 
 Gas transport costs ($/GJ),  where Moomba used as the NEM reference price  
 Variable and fixed operating and maintenance costs ($/MWh and $/MW/year 
respectively) 
 Scheduled outage rates and probability of forced outage rates (% hours/year). 
3.8.1 Generation capacity and investment 
Historical generation plant behaviour was sourced from AEMO’s data server [56], with 
technical specifications for all current generation assets sourced from AEMO, ACIL, Worley 
Parsons and BREE ([42, 48, 49, 56-60]). Particular attention was given to generation plant 
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with long-term supply contracts which were likely to be in place from 2030 onwards. 
Inclusion of the above data provided an accurate predictor of generation plant likely to be 
economically and technically feasible [42, 48, 49, 56, 61-65] for operation in 2035.  
3.8.2 Fuel Prices 
The cost projections for coal for use in QLD, NSW and VIC power generation were sourced 
from recent assessments on fuel prices by AEMO and others [42, 48, 49, 56-60, 63, 66, 67]. 
Furthermore, due to the lack of infrastructure to support international trade, coal prices for 
power generation are projected to remain subdued and stable until 2050. Natural gas costs 
and market conditions are the subject of another model which will be discussed in Section 4.  
 
3.8.3 Network 
The network topology used within the modelling framework was initially sourced from 
AEMO’s NTNDP [42], with its corresponding constraints on inter-region transmission flow. 
Upgrades to the network for this paper were only assumed if they had been previously 
announced or currently under consideration by the market operator AEMO or the Australian 
Energy Regulator (AER). Furthermore, the optimal expansion of the transmission network 
will be discussed further in this report in collaboration with Projects 1, 2 and 4. 
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4 Natural Gas Market Modelling 
Australia is in a key geographic and strategic position to supply a sizable proportion of the 
Asia Pacific regions’ LNG demand, and potentially be one of the world’s largest suppliers 
(see  [68]). Current trends in the development of the natural gas industry, particularly in 
Western Australia, have shown that the internationalization of prices can have a significant 
impact on electricity prices [69], carbon emissions [45, 47, 70], and the availability of gas for 
industrial users [71]. The effects of the expected uplift in prices with trade between two 
markets, price in each adjusts depending on the elasticities of supply and demand (see Figure 
4).  
 
Further, the arbitrage opportunities which are presented to US produces to the detriment of 
Australia’s interests are also of concern, such that the prevailing spot price in Japan has 
historically been much higher than the comparative European ports [72]. The newly 
improved transport cost conditions (due to the upgrade of the Panama Canal) make East 
Asian markets a very attractive prospect for US shale gas producers [73, 74].  
 
While the demand for natural gas in Australia pales in comparison to its export potential [71], 
there are numerous concerns surrounding the potential effects that exports may have on 
industrial users and electricity generators. These competing interests are also apparent, 
particularly between state governments, who are likely to receive a significant boost in 
resource rents and somewhat higher availability of cheap supply for domestic consumption. 
  
Aside from the significant coal reserves in Queensland, one of the key drivers for coal seam 
gas exploration was the implementation of the Gas Electricity Scheme in 1994 [75, 76]. 
Accredited electricity generators could create tradable certificates which represented one 
MWh of eligible generation. The schemes initial intention was to diversify the generation 
mix, encouraging gas exploration and to offset the then high costs of using natural gas. This 
inherent interest in using gas from electricity in Queensland was complemented by the 
growing concern for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
Similarly the New South Wales (NSW) government in 2003 implemented the NSW 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (NGGAS), which mandated a reduction in CO2 
emissions per capita by 2007. The development of new gas powered generation assets which 
could supply electricity to NSW (natively or by transmission interconnection) were thus 
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capable of contributing to this abatement target. These two schemes were closed in 2013 and 
2012 respectively due to the significant discovery of natural gas resources in QLD and the 
introduction of national emissions reduction legislation [77].  
 
 
Figure 3: World Gas Production Optimistic Case 
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Figure 4: The effects of international market linkage 
 
The modelling framework ATESHGAH [78, 79], is well placed within the international 
energy literature which has an extensive history of implementing Complementarity models 
for examining oil and natural gas markets [80-82]. Many of these models that were 
developed, address fundamental policy issues affecting natural gas markets. For example: the 
disruption of Russian gas supplies via the Ukraine [83]; intra-European trade and capacity 
bottlenecks [84, 85]; the potential cartelization of global gas markets [86]; the influence of 
Eurasian gas supplies, and; the strategic implications of the South Stream pipeline [77]. The 
use of Complementarity methods has also been used in a variety of studies which examine 
the market liberalization process in a number of international contexts [87]. 
 
This report summarizes the inputs and overarching assumptions for the Non-Linear Program 
(NLP) which in turn applies the Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) based framework, 
to examine multi-producer oligopolistic agent behaviour via Nash-Cournot equilibrium in the 
Eastern Australia natural gas market (EGM). This modelling platform has been developed in 
GAMS to take advantage of its ability to model both economic problems, but also its 
implementation of the MCP solver known as PATH [88-90]. More specifically, this 
deterministic and myopic model examines the production trends, system adequacy and 
capacity, and nodal spot prices, over a multi-period time scale (2015-2030).  
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The model developed by Wagner [78], is focused on analyzing the international linkages that 
the EGM will have with its main export partners in Asia and the likely effects on production 
and wholesale gas costs. The economic behaviour of agents in this newly minted 
internationalized market is modelled via an optimization problem and market clearing 
conditions. The principle agents which we have considered here are producers, 
traders/marketers, and consumers in three crucial sectors (GPG, MMLI and LNG). The roles 
of end-users and marketers have been simplified so that a producer who would normally face 
several intermediaries before delivering to the final consumer, faces an aggregated demand 
curve for each node in the network. In contrast to other models whose implementation of 
multiple staged games [86] link several demand curves and a border price which would 
overly complicate this model. We have assumed that producers act as semi-vertically 
integrated agents whose roles fit more in context with the EGM [71, 78].  
 
The primary objective for creating this model was to examine the strategic interactions 
between the producer agents and LNG exporters. We have implicitly assumed that there is no 
material benefit for disaggregating traders/marketers from the supply side. As noted above, 
the aggregation of these roles is a reasonable and necessary assumption given that producers 
such as Arrow and Origin not only sell at the bulk supply level, they consume natural gas as a 
production input into markets such as GPG and LNG. Furthermore, as we only consider 
yearly time intervals for demand we are able to avoid any issues with long-term contracts for 
supply and spot market behavioural issues which is in keeping with the international 
experience with modelling these types of markets [91-93] and more specifically their 
linkage/interconnection [94]. 
4.1 Data 
The purpose of this model is to provide a comprehensive representation of all producers in 
the EGM. The data set includes all producing fields (by owner/operator), pipelines 
(transmission and major laterals) and demand by the three main gas consuming sectors within 
the interconnected eastern market.  
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We assume that there is an integrated producer/trader/marketer agent whose objective is to 
maximize profits when faced with nodal inverse demand curves. The lack of data availability 
on nodal Mass Market (MM) and Light Industrial (LI) demand (excluding utility gas powered 
generation), is one of the limitations of this model. Aggregate historical and forecasts of 
demand for the combined sector MM/LI is used to maintain the appropriate level of scope for 
this analysis. Similar agent aggregations have also been seen in the international literature, 
and the experience with modelling the European [83, 91, 93] and US markets [92], further 
justifies our methodology.  
Initially the base year 2013, is used to parametrize the model for simulation, which allows us 
to establish the yearly and long-term structural consequences of international market linkage 
for the EGM with its key Asian trading partners. The literature which examines similar 
markets/regional trade blocks, has deemed it sufficient to evaluate these situations via yearly 
time steps [86, 92, 95]. The omission of daily or seasonal effects associated with demand may 
lead to different results, especially in the presence of binding transport constraints and high 
levels of capacity utilization. However, the use of storage and inter-period arbitrage by 
producers/processors can overcome some of these difficulties [92, 95].  
 
The data and analysis presented in this report are represented in SI units. Therefore, reserves 
are expressed in petajoules (PJ); production, transport capacity and demand in PJ/year, which 
allows for us to neglect differential qualities and facilitate constraint qualifications to be 
uniformly applied. We shall now explore the construction of the base case data set and detail 
the possible scenarios and their implementation.  
 
The availability of resources in the EGM has been sourced from the technical literature [83, 
86], state and federal regulators [71, 96, 97], the market operator [98-100], industry analysts 
[66, 101-103] and corporate reporting [104, 105] (also see Figure 5). The discovery, firming 
up and transformation of reserve tranches are all sourced and calculated exogenously to this 
modelling framework [97, 102, 103]. The 13 basins’ reserve and resource base case data is 
shown below in Table 1 and Table 2 (by basin and by resource type). It should be noted that 
each basin is associated with a single resource type. For example, the resources associated 
with Surat/Bowen are considered conventional natural gas, whereas the Bowen and Surat 
Basins rows describe the distribution of coal seam gas. 
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Figure 5: Australia’s natural gas basins. Source: Geoscience Australia 
Production costs have been sourced from a range of commercial services, industry reports 
and government reports [71, 100]. Each field is composed of tenures and grouped by 
geological formation and owner/developer (as in [106, 107]). Each field (producing area) has 
detailed estimates of reserves and resources with a range of costs associated with extraction 
(cf. [99]). The costs associated with each tranche of possible production is then used to 
calibrate the supply cost curve (via the Golombek supply cost function [108]).  
 
Table 3 shows example fields with corresponding reserves and costs. We also provide the 
cumulative cost curve for natural gas by production tranche within each basin (see Figure 6). 
It shows that 50% of all available reserves have an expected production cost of $5.16/GJ, 
which far exceeds the expected average cost of US shale gas production at $2-3/GJ? [92, 
109]. 
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Table 1: Natural Gas Reserves within the Eastern States 
Basin Resource 2P 3P 2C 3C URR 
 Type (PJ) (PJ) (PJ) (PJ) (PJ) 
 Bass Conventional 338 250 360 268 726 
 Bowen CSG 8,535 25,130 4,345 2,834 31,488 
 Clarence/Moreton CSG 445 2,922 2,511 629 6,062 
 Cooper/Eromanga Mixed 2,198 1,901 6,416 244 8,488 
 Galilee CSG - - 259 1,634 1,634 
 Gippsland Conventional 3,890 3,859 1,094 10,000 14,192 
 Gloucester CSG 669 832 - - 832 
 Gunnedah CSG 1,426 1,426 3,460 - 4,886 
 Maryborough Shale - 3,000 - - 3,000 
 Otway Conventional 604 - 274 - 878 
 Surat CSG 28,835 38,831 11,979 - 50,810 
 Surat-Bowen Conventional 76 106 2,000 - 2,106 
 Sydney CSG 424 728 - - 728 
 Totals  47,440 78,985 32,698 15,609 125,830 
 
Table 2: Natural gas reserves by resource type 
Resource 2P 3P 2C 3C URR 
Type (PJ) (PJ) (PJ) (PJ) (PJ) 
 Conventional 1,790 2,007 4,176 244 6,349 
 CSG 40,334 69,868 22,554 5,097 96,440 
 Offshore 4,832 4,109 1,728 10,268 15,796 
 Shale - 3,000 - - 3,000 
 Unconventional 5 - 4,240 - 4,245 
 Totals 47,440 78,985 32,698 15,609 125,830 
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Table 3: Field reserve and production cost data example 
Node Roma Spring Gully Kogan 
Field Roma OA ATP 592 Kogan East 
State QLD QLD QLD 
Producer Santos Origin Arrow 
Basin Surat Bowen Surat 
Region Walloons (West) Fairview Walloons (East) 
Resource Type CSM CSM CSM 
 Reserves and Resources (PJ) 
2P 1824 232 60 
3P 2416 682 79 
2C 758 96 25 
URR 3174 779 105 
 Production Costs ($/GJ) 
 Low 3.13 1.93 1.40 
Mid 5.04 3.17 3.80 
High 6.06 3.81 4.24 
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Figure 6: Marginal Cost Curve for the Eastern Australian Gas Market 
 
The functional form of the Golombek primary cost function  
 
 
𝐶𝑖(𝑣𝑖) = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑣𝑖 +
1
2
𝛽 ∗ 𝑣𝑖
2 − 𝛾 ∗ (𝑉𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖) ∗ ln (1 −
𝑣𝑖
𝑉𝑖
) − 𝛾 ∗ 𝑣𝑖 , (1) 
 
The marginal cost function is as follows: 
  
where vi, is the volume of production in time t, α is the minimum cost of production, β and γ 
are parameters fitted to the change in production costs associated with accessing increasingly 
deeper and more difficult to extract gas and Vi is the remaining reserves. The sensitivity of 
each of the aforementioned coefficient is presented in Figure 7. We present three key supply 
fields with their associated Golombek coefficients in Table 4 and an example of the marginal 
cost curve for the unconventional Cooper/Eromanga fields in Figure 7.  
 
𝑀𝐶𝑖(𝑣𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑣𝑖 − 𝛾 ∗ ln (1 −
𝑣𝑖
𝑉𝑖
), (2) 
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of the Golombek marginal cost of supply curve 
 
 
Figure 8: Cooper Eromanga/Golombek marginal cost of supply curve 
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Table 4: Golomobek Function Coefficients for Example Fields 
 Node Roma Spring Gully Kogan 
Field Roma OA ATP 592 Kogan East 
Α 3.35 4.70 3.01 
Β 0.061 0.0044 0.00108 
Γ -0.015 -0.00099 -0.003157 
  
Processing capacity is sourced from AEMO’s annual planning reports (GSOO [99, 100]), and 
it should also be noted that processing capacity is dealt with implicitly as an exogenous upper 
bound on production capacity. Thus, expansion timing and entry timing of processing plant is 
derived from AEMO [100].  
Transport pipelines and the formation of the network topology has been derived from [99, 
100], and more generally from [101]. The maximum flow capacity along each pipeline 
pathway within the network of nodes, is by necessity an exogenous input into the model. 
Contrary to the production and processing capacities, the dual of the utilization in network 
capacity is required for the model formation. Pipeline network expansion can also be 
implemented via scenarios for policy planning and analysis or with optimal expansion 
techniques discussed in André [110]. We present the main transmission pipelines which 
create the backbone of the network topology below in Table 5. A stylized version of the 
entire network topology for the EGM pipeline network is presented in Figure 9. 
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Table 5: Main Transmission Pipelines 
 Pipeline Length Diameter Owner Tariff Forward Backward 
 (km) (mm)  $/GJ Capacity Capacity 
 SW Qld Pipline 937 400 APA 0.85 385 360 
 Carpentaria Gas 840 450 APA 1.46 119 119 
 Roma-Brisbane 438 950 APA 1.01 232 232 
 Moomba-Sydney 1300 2200 APA 0.75 523 523 
 Moomba-
Adelaide 
1185 900 QIC 0.55 253 253 
 NSW-Vic 88 450 APA 0.78 92 128 
 SEA Pipeline 680 450 APA 0.7 314 314 
 SW Pipeline 202 500 APA 0.23 430 129 
 Vic-Tas 734 700 Palisade 2.00 130 0 
 Eastern-Aust 797 450 Jemena 1.16 288 288 
 Qld-GP 630 500 Jemena 0.90 142 142 
 Longford-Melb 174 1250 APA 0.24 965 130 
 Nth Qld Gas 393 254 Vic. Funds 0.51 50 0 
 Young-Wagga 131 450 APA 0.075 92 128 
 Melb-NSW-Vic 445 450 APA 0.99 71 500 
  
4.1.1 Natural Gas Demand 
The demand for natural gas by the LNG sector has been initially sourced from [71, 96, 100, 
101, 103]. We assume that the required minimum capacity utilization rate for each of the 
proposed liquification facilities is set at 93% [111]. Furthermore, the timing of demand is a 
key variable, and is therefore considered in the scenario planning capability of this model. It 
should be noted that the demand is assumed to incorporate the losses associated with pipeline 
transport and liqification as is presented via the "as-produced" method in a similar fashion to 
the electricity sector [112, 113]. The timing of additional liquification plant trains to 
correspond to export demand, further developments in gas reserves and international demand, 
is also sourced from [100, 101].  
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The reference prices of demand for gas by the LNG sector is derived from the Free-on-board 
(Fob) netback equivalent price with respect to the Japanese hub Cargo-insurance-freight price 
(Cif). The derived Cif prices presented here for model calibration is sourced from the burner 
tip equivalent of the Japanese Crude Cocktail (JCC) price for oil translated into a gas price 
via the standard oil index linked S-curve [111, 113]. The demand curve, an iso-elastic non-
linear function is represented with respect to our assumptions of quantity and reference price 
via the JCC/S-Curve pricing methodology [113].  
The electricity generation sector is greatly affected by a shift in price and availability of 
natural gas [47]. As such, the future development of Gas fired Power Generation (GPG) is 
particularly sensitive to long-term prices and has had similar market integration issues when 
gas supply networks have been interconnected via international exports (e.g. Western 
Australia [111]). The demand for natural gas by GPG’s has been sourced from [100]. 
Furthermore, technical specifications for each of these power stations is sourced from [42, 48, 
49, 57, 58, 62, 63, 112, 114]. We calibrate the likely bounds of demand given historical 
operating capacities  [42, 49], as a mid-point estimate. The upper and lower bounds for 
natural gas demand is derived from each GPG’s installed capacity, heat rate (GJ/MWh), the 
type of operation (baseload, intermediate or peaking) and the technology type of the gas 
turbine (open or combined cycle), are all used to exogenously parameterize each power 
station.  
The combined Mass Market/Light Industry sector historical and forecasts of demand for 
natural gas has been calculated from AEMO [100] and BREE  [71, 96]. Historical prices at 
each of the corresponding nodes to AEMO’s original network topology [99, 100] have been 
used to parametrize the iso-elastic inverse demand curve for the sector. Elasticities of demand 
have been sourced from the literature to further aid in the construction of this model [115-
118]. We have chosen to represent the demand for natural gas in any node/market m, by 
applying a non-linear iso-elastic demand function which can be represented as follows: 
 
  
 
𝐷𝑚 = 𝐷𝑚
𝑂 [
𝑃𝑚(𝐷𝑚)
𝑃𝑚
𝑂 ]
𝜎𝑚
 (3) 
  32 
 
where 𝐷𝑚 and 𝑃𝑚(𝐷𝑚) are the levels of demand and price at equilibrium, 𝐷𝑚
𝑂  and 𝑃𝑚
𝑂 are the 
reference (historical) demand and prices respectively in market m in 2013 [98]. The price 
elasticity of demand 𝜎𝑚, for the three sectors in this model (GPG, LNG and MM/LI) is 
sourced from previous literature [117, 119, 120]. As mentioned earlier in this report, we shall 
neglect the full technical description of the market clearing conditions and algorithmic 
methods for simulating this market model and again refer the reader to [78]. 
 
Figure 9: Stylized Network Diagram of the Eastern Australian Natural Gas Market 
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4.2 Base Case Simulation Results 
The base case scenario presented here creates a comparative benchmark for future scenario 
development for policy analysis. This base case is largely used as a mechanism for parameter 
validation and as a proof of concept rather than a most likely case and should be viewed as 
such. Initially, we assume that the Japanese Cif price remains high, which corresponds to the 
medium scenario for global oil prices which reaches ~160/bbl in 2040 [121]. Demand for 
natural gas has been derived from the AEMO Gas statement of Opportunities (see [99, 100]). 
Electricity market generation behaviour has been derived from AEMO [42, 48, 49]  and we 
further assume that entry timing and retirements are within the bounds of previously reported 
rates [47].  
 
The LNG sector is assumed to have an investment and production profile that is largely 
derived from [99, 100]. Furthermore, we also assume that the entry of ARROW gas reserves 
will be delayed and the associated national supply and marginal cost curve is shifted to the 
left (see Figure 10). While this shift in the supply curve is dramatic, the resulting gas prices 
for the Eastern Australian capital cities are still somewhat in line with the expectations of 
AEMO and Core Energy’s analysis [102, 103]. While world gas markets are now in turmoil 
given the current Saudi Arabian led OPEC over production of oil and gas, the world being 
awash with gas is still a somewhat interesting and important scenario to examine. The results 
presented in Figure 11 and  Figure 12, while not out of sample with AEMO [100], nor its 
counterpart Core Energy [103], estimate that prices will remain high. This base case 
mentioned here represents a proof of concept for the modelling platform and its integration 
with electricity market modelling.  
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Figure 10: Marginal cost curve shift associated with a delay supply 
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Figure 11: Natural Gas Spot Prices Base Case Scenario 
 
Figure 12: Supply node production schedule over time 
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5 Future Grid Scenario Modelling 
 
In this section we will provide an overview of the scenario frameworks employed by Project 
3 and the CSIRO Future Grid Cluster [50]. We will then provide a brief overview of the 
relationships between the CSIRO’s Future Grid Forum (CFGF) Scenarios and how the cluster 
will proceed with its modelling. Furthermore, this report will largely focus on Project 3’s 
modelling results for the
 
first of the CFGF scenarios with an expanded sensitivity and 
parameter suite.  
 
Figure 13: Future Grid Forum core scenarios [50] 
Project 3 will reexamine and re-establish the CFGF scenarios from first principles and this 
reformulation will allow for the Future Grid Cluster projects to take into account a broader 
range of: policy/regulatory; economic/market and technological influences. These three key 
system influencer categories are inextricably linked and therefore need to be modelled. 
Furthermore, these drivers are the cornerstone to scenario development and quite like a chain 
of influencers which will result in a transparent elucidation of the modelling assumptions.  
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Firstly, the key influencers were summarized into ten scenario kernel elements that are 
somewhat independent of each other. We then generate a set of “Reduced Scenarios” that can 
be used for discussion, scenario selection and external communication purposes. Secondly, 
scenarios are represented via all of their explicit sub-components which reflect the “micro” 
inputs which generate the parameter suite that needs to be modelled explicitly. 
5.1 The four influences 
 
The four categories of key influences and their inter-relationships are set out in this Section 
and we provide a further overview of Project 3’s scenario construction and integration with 
the CFGF.  
 
1) Policy (and regulatory) decisions  
 Actions in the policy and regulation space which are under the control of 
Australian policymakers and stakeholders 
 Policy actions are orthogonal to states of the world 
 Can depend on outcomes of states of the world 
 Policy and regulatory decisions can be classified into either supply- or demand-
side focused. 
 
2) States of the World 
 Forces or influences that are outside Australia’s control are described here by the 
following three categories: 
a. Supply-side forces: These include changes in the parameters of key supply 
side technologies, such as technology costs and costs of fuel feed-stocks   
b. Demand-side forces, that are further divided into two sub-categories, those 
being:  
 Structural and behavioural, and 
 Technological development related 
c. International Forces which includes actions of markets and policy decisions by 
other countries. 
3) Sensivities  
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Many policy and states of the world need to be modelled as having two or three outcomes. 
Some are binary (yes/no) and some are sensitivities with several states. We chose to limit 
sensitivities to three levels, that is, low, medium, and high (or slow, medium, and fast in the 
case of rate based parameters, such as technological learning). This limitation is imposed in 
order to limit the extent of the combinatorial explosion that arises when combining all the 
different possible outcomes. 
 
4) Linkages 
There are also interactions between the various forces and their sensitivities. In particular, it 
is important to note that there can be linkages within and between forces in the following two 
categories: 
 States of the world 
 Policy. 
5.2 Scenario Kernels 
In order to facilitate the communication of Project 3’s modelling results for scenarios that are 
relevant to policy and investment decisions, we need to work at an appropriate level of detail. 
Since the Future Grid Cluster is only concerned with the impacts of policies and external 
forces on large-scale infrastructure investments and wholesale market behaviour, the kernel 
scenarios will be handled at this level. The structure for developing the Project 3 scenarios is 
shown in Table 6.  
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Table 6: Kernel elements 
Kernel Element States of the World 
Supply Side   Low/Slow Medium High/Fast 
Technology 
costs and 
selection 
Fossil Technology 
costs 
1    
Renewable/Zero 
emission 
Technology costs 
reduction 
2 
 
   
Fossil Fuel Costs 3    
Climate policy 
Carbon Pricing 4    
Renewable Energy 
Target 
5    
Electricity 
Demand 
  Decline BAU High 
Energy Growth 
(GWh) 
 6 
 
   
Demand 
profile changes 
  Decrease Status 
Quo 
Increase 
Load Factor 
Change 
7    
  -> Day Status 
Quo 
-> Night 
Day to Night 
Load peak shift  
8    
Policy Support 
for renewable 
generation 
  Yes No  
Transmission Super projects 9    
Scale Efficient Network Extensions 10    
 
The above table sets out the ten kernel elements grouped into three major categories: supply-
side, demand-side, and policy support. It should be noted that there are eight elements with 
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three sensitivities and a further two which have two sensitivities. This leads to a total of 
26,244 possible combinations which are not easily manageable for without a methodology 
such as ours. 
5.3 Scenario Planning: BAU/Counter Factual 
Establishing a set of scenarios which examines the possible future given a set of prior 
assumptions is a difficult exercise [122-124]. The most common starting point for any 
investigation using the “Scenario Analysis” methodology [125, 126], is to create a counter-
factual that may or may not represent our future expected states, but is used as a reference 
state for comparison [127].  
This counterfactual in our case is used to create a well-defined rule based environment whose 
main value is to elucidate the current state of affairs in the electricity sector and to understand 
an idealised representation completely [46, 128]. While a very idealised picture of the 
electricity market may turn out to be an approximate and somewhat incomplete picture of the 
real world, its “valuefulness” lies in the construction of such a conceptual framework [128], 
as outlined in this report and the previous deliverables [129, 130]. Furthermore, due to recent 
policy volatility and an increasingly visible trend in the decline of electricity demand this 
scenario shouldn’t be regarded as a “Business As Usual” case study. Furthermore, this 
methodology remains useful as a reference or counterfactual scenario against which other 
scenarios could be compared [125, 128, 130-132]. 
While this BAU/Counter Factual is mostly self-explanatory the broad aspects of this scenario 
are as follows: 
 Demand for electricity is assumed to be increasing in terms of total annual energy (as 
generated) and with respect to peak demand. 
 The shape of the load duration curve and load factors for each of the NEM states 
remains the same (as shown in the 2012 and 2014 AEMO NTNDPs’ [42, 133]). 
 Greenhouse gas (GHG) and Renewable Energy Target (RET) policies are both 
assumed to be with the moderate/medium carbon price trajectories and the previous 
RET (41 TWh at 2020 which equates to roughly 20% of all electricity generated). 
 Technological costs, for conventional (combustion) and renewable energy generators 
have been sourced from a survey of the best available forecasts (i.e. from [42, 45, 50, 
57-60, 134-136]). 
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The assumptions used to develop this BAU/Counter Factual scenario are presented in Table 
7 and were originally developed for a similar exercise by this project team [45, 137]. 
Following the broad overview presented in Table 7 we will now provide the homoeomorphic 
mapping into the scenario kernel elements via  
 
 
 
 
Table 8. 
 
 
Table 7: BAU/Counter Factual Scenario Assumptions 
Forces underpinning 
scenario 
Long-term historic trend consumption growth 
No consumer reaction to rising prices 
Gas prices reflect global energy trends 
Climate change not an issue 
No recognition of technology shift to renewables and 
distributed generation 
Capital costs (2035) 
CCGT $1100/kW 
OCGT $1100/kW 
Wind $2558/kW 
Network topology Existing 
Generation locations Located close to transmission infrastructure 
Modelling 
assumptions 
Wind intermittent to 30% capacity factor 
Fuel price 
(Moomba), (2035) 
Medium Gas $8.32/GJ 
Low gas price $4.89/GJ 
High gas price $12/GJ 
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Table 8: BAU/Counter Factual Scenario Kernels 
BAU/ Counter Factual 
    
Kernels   
Kernel 
Eleme
nt 
States of the World 
Supply Side     
Low/Slo
w 
Medium 
High/Fas
t 
Technology costs 
and selection 
Fossil Technology 
costs 
1   X   
Renewable/Zero 
emission 
Technology costs 
reduction 
2   X   
Fossil Fuel Costs 3   X   
Climate policy 
Carbon Pricing 4   X   
Renewable Energy 
Target 
5   X   
Electricity Demand   Decline BAU High 
Energy Growth 
(GWh)  
6 
 
X 
 
Demand profile 
changes 
Load Factor 
Change 
  Decrease Status Quo Increase 
7 
 
X   
Day to Night 
demand peak shift 
  -> Day Status Quo -> Night 
8 
 
X 
 
Policy Support for renewable   Yes No   
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generation 
Transmission Super projects 9   X   
Scale Efficient Network Extensions 10   X   
 
5.4 Scenario Correspondence between CFGF and the Project 3 CFGC 
The CFGF has taken a similar and somewhat related approach to developing its own scenario 
suite but has traversed a slight different path via its need to use detailed modelling levers. 
This has translated into a modelling and simulation input based approach. Furthermore, the 
scope and scale of the CFGF had the additional requirement of examining distribution system 
investment due to expansion, asset replacement and end-user pricing impacts and for the 
potential for changing elasticities in demand. 
The CFGF scenarios have been constructed via three differentiators:  
 Centralised generation versus distributed generation 
 Significance of peak demand growth and the flattening (skewness) of the load profile 
 Deployment of large scale renewable energy generation projects. 
These differentiators are represented within this projects’ scenario modelling framework, 
while also incorporating the relationships between the scenario Kernels (as illustrated in 
Table 9). Furthermore, the CFGF scenario drivers are shown in Table 10 below.  
Below in Table 9, the relationship between this projects methodology of using supply- and 
demand-side based drivers, and the CFGF scenarios is shown. Given that there are a variety 
of ways that drivers can be classified, we have used a mapping matrix as a guide to 
translating between the two slightly different approaches. As we have reported previously 
[129, 130], for example, we break the growth of distributed generation (DG) impacts into 
three components which then become drivers for the modelling scenarios: energy efficiency; 
and load profile changes of two kinds, load factor changes; and shifts of the peak to different 
times of the day. While this matrix is not exhaustive, experience is needed to transform the 
input data into inputs using our framework. We have done this in Project 3 by setting up the 
assumptions database. Also note that the CFGF’s energy efficiency driver also maps to the 
same three drivers in our framework as it can influence all of the above to varying degrees. 
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5.5 Representing the Scenarios for the CSIRO Future Grid Cluster 
The CSIRO Future Grid Scenarios have to be transformed and unbundled to suit 
communication between the diverse modelling frameworks/tools that are used by the 
different projects in the Cluster. It should be further noted that without an explicit 
specification of how the CSIRO scenarios are related to specific scenario settings/switches it 
will become increasingly difficult to ensure that each project in the Cluster are using the same 
scenario parameters assumptions, inputs or drivers.  
The key differences between the framework presented here and the previous deliverable to 
the Future Grid Forum’s representation of the scenarios is that we identify the:  
1. Distinction between supply- and demand-side drivers.  
 No explicit delineation between supply- and demand-side drivers  
o Future Grid Cluster is focussed on transmission level models and effects.  
o Project 3 will not be explicitly modelling the costs and impacts of various 
battery storage scenarios or retail tariff innovations.  
 Project 1 will be examining these aspects of the Distribution 
system. 
o These will be modelled for by including them as externalities through 
using the different load growth and load shape scenarios sourced from the 
CSIRO FGF. 
2. Differentiation between controllable and uncontrollable drivers.  
 FGF scenarios have no explicit distinction made between controllable and 
uncontrollable drivers.  
 Examples such as:  
o Carbon pricing policies and developments of new customer pricing 
frameworks or; 
o States of the World and include variables such as natural gas prices or 
technology costs. 
The reduced scenario representation is an extremely useful tool in order to communicate 
results and to identify and map the CFGF scenarios to the FGC scenarios controllable and 
uncontrollable drivers. In Table 11 we have detailed these linkages and demonstrate how all 
scenarios (CFGF and FGC) are classified according to both the supply- and demand-side and 
according to the controllability of these by Australian policy makers. 
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Table 9: Project 3 and CSIRO Future Grid Forum Scenarios 
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Project 3 Scenarios 
Kernels 
              
Supply Side 
Kernel 
Element 
Technology costs and 
selection 
Fossil Technology costs 1        X 
    
  
Renewable/Zero emission 
Technology costs 
reduction 
2               X           
Fossil Fuel Costs 3                     X     
Climate policy 
Carbon Pricing 4             X             
Renewable Energy Target 5             X           X 
Demand Side 
 
                          
Energy Growth (GWh) 
 
6 X X 
   
X 
  
X X   X 
 
Demand profile 
changes 
Load Factor Change 7 X X X X X X     X     X   
Day to Night demand 
peak shift 
8 X X X X X       X     X   
Policy Support for renewable generation 
 
                          
Transmission Super projects 9                           
Scale Efficient Network Extensions 10                           
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Table 10: CFGF Scenarios and drivers
1
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
DG share Low High High High 
EV uptake Modest 
Managed charge profile  
Medium-high  
Managed charge profile  
Medium-high  
Absent charge profile  
High  
Managed charge profile  
Demand response 
(storage)  
Equivalent to Resi. 1kW for 5 hours 0-
20% 2015-2030 but centrally located in 
suburb  
Resi. 1kW for 5 hours  
0-20% 2015-2030 
In individual homes  
Used off-grid. 5kW batteries plus 2.2kW 
diesel back-up  
Resi. 1kW for 5 hours  
0-20% 2015-2030 
In individual homes  
Demand response 
(HVAC)  
Both resi. and comm. managed  Both resi. and comm. managed  Unmanaged, remaining customers can’t 
afford upfront costs  
Both resi. and comm. managed  
Demand response (Industrial)  Managed  Managed  Unmanaged, remaining customers can’t 
afford actions  
Managed  
Disconnections  RAPS only  RAPS only  All existing and new DG owners by 2020  RAPS only  
GHG reduction commitment  Moderate carbon price  Moderate carbon price  Moderate carbon price  Moderate carbon price plus extended 
RET to 100%  
Technology costs  AETA projections for CG, CSIRO for 
DG, storage, large scale solar PV  
AETA projections for CG, CSIRO for 
DG, storage, large scale solar PV  
AETA projections for CG, CSIRO for DG, 
storage, large scale solar PV  
Accelerated based on stronger global 
abatement commitment  
Energy efficiency  AEMO moderate growth case based on 
current price pressures  
AEMO moderate growth case based 
on current price pressures  
Low energy consumption due to relatively 
higher costs for those left on grid  
Low energy consumption based on 
expected higher  prices due to lower 
emissions  
Network  Modest expansion. Load factor 
maintained 
Flat. Significant decline in load factor Flat. Significant decline in load factor Load factor declining. Expansion to 
connect renewables  
Gas price assumption  AETA medium  AETA low supporting gas on-site 
generation 
AETA low supporting gas on-site generation AETA medium 
Customer pricing framework  Cost reflective supporting engagement  Cost reflective supporting 
engagement  
Non-cost reflective encouraging 
disconnection  
Cost reflective supporting engagement  
Large scale renewables  Substantial but some technologies 
limited by cost of back-up  
Substantial but some technologies 
limited by cost of back-up 
Substantial but some technologies limited by 
cost of back-up 
Very high supported by storage and 
lower costs  
                                            
1
 CSIRO Future Grid Forum – “Modeling The Future Grid Forum Scenarios”, Table 3, page 18. 
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Table 11: CSIRO Future Grid Forum and the Cluster Project 3 Scenario drivers 
 Controllable Drivers Uncontrollable Drivers 
Cluster 
Project 3 
Supply 
Side 
Climate policy 
Carbon Pricing 
Renewable Energy Target  
Transmission Super projects / Super 
grids 
Scale Efficient Network Extensions 
Technology costs (Affected by 
overseas policies) 
Fossil Fuel Costs (Affected by 
overseas policies) 
 
 
Demand 
Side 
Energy Efficiency Electricity Demand 
Energy Growth (Annual 
Energy) 
Demand Profile Change (Inc. 
Peak Demand growth/decline) 
CSIRO 
FGF 
Supply 
Side 
GHG reduction commitment  
Large scale renewables 
Technology Costs 
Gas price assumptions 
 
Demand 
Side 
Network (Investment/price 
regulation) 
Customer Pricing Framework 
Reform (CSIRO FGF) 
EV Uptake (With managed 
charging) 
Demand Response (HVAC) 
Demand Response (industrial) 
 
Energy Efficiency 
Disconnections 
DG Share 
Demand Response (Storage) 
 
5.6 Scenario 1: “Set and Forget” 
This section will set out the first scenario “Scenario 1: Set and Forget” and show how the 
FGC will endeavour to model this possible policy and supply- and demand-side agent 
behavioural approach. Initially we will set out four tables which show how the CFGF 
Scenarios will translate into the reduced scenario framework. With these tables, we will show 
not only how the mapping unfolds (a homeomorphic mapping), but also how each of the 
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kernel/driver settings shown in Table 10 will translate into the sensitivities required by 
Project 3 for its reduced scenario representation.  In each of the tables the controllable policy 
drivers have been coloured in orange text while the others in black are seen to be 
uncontrollable. While the distinction between supply- and demand-side drivers may not 
appear to be very clear, we have highlighted the demand related ones in light green (see 
Table 12 to Table 16). Furthermore, it should be noted that we have endeavored to maintain 
the order of the drivers/policy to facilitate comparisons between FGF and the CFGF derived 
from [50]. This initial modelling was conducted over the planning horizon 2016-2045 (30 
years). It should be further noted that the future modelling undertaken by this project will 
have a longer horizon out to 2050.  
 
5.6.1 Assumptions and Data for Scenario 1 
We shall now provide a brief overview of the data requirements, broad policy and market 
characteristics that are used to formulate this scenario within out electricity market simulation 
platform PLEXOS.  
Electricity market investigation should factor in expected consumer behaviour. It is 
anticipated that in this scenario, the current policy drivers and conditions would indicate that 
consumers are subject to the full cost reflective pricing framework which will support and 
facilitate engagement [50].  
Consumer responsiveness mechanisms such as reduced demand (Demand Side Management 
DSM) is also relatively moderate and controlled via the DNSP. This mechanisms sensitivity 
is largely consistent with the analysis of AEMO’s 2014 NTNDP [42] and their prior 
investigations into DSM roll out [49, 138]. The ability of consumers to respond to electricity 
market conditions is mainly driven via the implementation of battery storage options within 
the distribution network system. Individual consumer uptake of storage is somewhat limited 
and is controlled centrally via the Distributional Network Service Provider (DNSP) (in a 
similar fashion to [45] and [46]). The rate of consumer and more generally appliance 
efficiency rates [139, 140], are assumed to be relatively modest and are consistent with the 
assumptions used by the CFGF modelling [50] and AEMO [42].  
The increase in distributed generation in the electricity sector is relatively modest as is its 
impact on demand. While in this scenario consumer action and potential disconnection is 
somewhat avoided, the need for such action is somewhat nullified by the centralised control 
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of DG and storage options. Furthermore, the rate of disconnection amongst all consumer 
types (industrial, commercial and residential) is limited to locational characteristics of those 
consumers. It is envisaged that disconnections are therefore limited to consumers who are 
located in remote areas (i.e. Remote Area Power Systems, RAPS). 
Electric Vehicle (EV) deployment is also fairly modest with no appreciable effects from 
uncontrolled charging. Furthermore, controlled charging is broadly implemented and as such 
has a lower impact on peak electricity demand [55]. While EV and Plug-in Hybrid Electric 
Vehicle (PHEV) deployment rates are modest it assumed that the world oil price will remain 
within the moderate estimates of the EIA and IEA [121, 141]. This medium/moderate price 
range estimate (≥$150/bbl by 2020), will in turn have a curtailment effect on the uptake of 
this technology within certain consumer group types, who are more motivated by 
environmental concerns over the cost of fuel for transportation.  
The technological costs associated with generation technologies have been sourced from the 
latest data and methods [42, 49, 136]. We will also provide in Table 17 (also we present in 
Figure 16 and Figure 17 the key years in our planning horizon graphically), a summary of 
the costs used in this initial modelling. These data represent the “Medium” technology cost 
projections for construction and connection in NSW (primarily the North-Central 
transmission zone, NCEN) from the 2014 AEMO NTNDP [42]. The deployment of 
renewable electricity generation options may be in fact substantial however ,the cost of 
backup may then limit the types of technologies which are likely to be deployed [50, 142]. 
However, this may be the case in this anticipated state of the world, the costs of back-up and 
more generally within the distribution network could still have an impact [143]. The GHG 
abatement target and pricing has been sourced from the Australian Government’s original 
commitment of 5% by 2020 with respect to 2000 levels. The forward carbon price projection 
has been provided by AEMO and the Australian Treasury [43].  
The expansion of the NEM transmission network in this scenario is assumed to be relatively 
modest. Transmission expansion needs which could be required due the large scale 
deployment of renewable generation are in line with those of AEMO NTNDP [42] and CFGC 
[50, 142]. Therefore, the need for transmission network super projects is unlikely given the 
expected generation investment schedule and the likely demand projections. 
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5.6.2 Fuel Price Projections 
Scenario 1 will use the medium black and brown coal forecasts from the recent 2014 AEMO 
NTNDP [42] as its initial benchmark price (see Figure 14). While the internationalisation of 
coal from Australia has yet to make an appreciable impact on domestic black coal prices, 
Hunter Valley coal producers may make the decision to export their coal in the future. This 
possibility is left for future research.  
 
Figure 14: Projected Coal Prices (Medium Forecast) 
As we have discussed earlier, this project has developed an integrated gas modelling 
framework (see section 4 above) and the price forecast which we have relied on here is the 
Low case scenario (see Figure 11). Furthermore, the gas forecast presented earlier in this 
report diverges with the expectations of forward prices present by the CFGC [50] by at least 
30-50% and those presented in [71, 100, 144], due not only to the methodological differences 
but also with respect to the assumed international market conditions. It should be noted that 
since that our initial modelling, natural gas prices have been suppressed by Saudi Arabian oil 
production increases which have flowed onto the Japanese and consequentially, Australian 
natural gas markets due to their linkage with oil [145]. 
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5.6.3 Demand Projections 
This first scenario uses the AEMO 2014 [42], medium electricity demand forecast (see 
Figure 15), which has the following endogenised characteristics: moderate adoption of 
embedded generation options; high adoption of peak load shaving technology deployment, 
and; conservative EV and PHEV deployment.  
 
Figure 15: NEM Demand Projections for Scenario 1 
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Table 12: Mapping of the CSIRO Future Grid Forum “Set and Forget” Scenario to Project 3 Scenario Framework 
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Table 13: Representation of the CSIRO Future Grid Forum Scenario 1 Domestic Policy 
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Table 14: Representation of the CSIRO Future Grid Forum Scenario 1 International Forces 
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Table 15: Representation of the CSIRO Future Grid Forum Scenario 1 Demand Side Forces 
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Table 16: Representation of the CSIRO Future Grid Forum Scenario 1 Technological Development 
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Table 17: Electricity Generation Technology Costs (Summary Based on NSW Capital Cost Estimates Real 2010 AUD) 
 Build Cost 2020 Build Cost 2025 Build Cost 2030 Build Cost 2035 Build Cost 2040 
 
Low Med. High Low Med. High Low Med. High Low Med. High Low Med. High 
Biomass 4994 5148 5163 4967 5131 5140 4984 5162 5171 5032 5229 5248 5077 5298 5331 
Solar PV DAT 4026 4065 4067 3984 4029 4017 3998 4052 4043 4073 4147 4155 4151 4254 4288 
Solar PV FFP 2518 2542 2544 2502 2530 2523 2511 2544 2539 2557 2603 2608 2606 2669 2690 
Solar PV SAT 3090 3120 3121 3064 3098 3089 3075 3116 3109 3132 3189 3195 3192 3270 3296 
Solar Thermal CLF 4517 4585 4591 4460 4531 4528 4467 4549 4547 4545 4648 4662 4631 4763 4803 
Solar Thermal CR WS 6689 6789 6798 6591 6698 6692 6601 6723 6721 6717 6871 6892 6846 7043 7102 
Solar Thermal PT WS 9094 9219 9241 8940 9072 9072 8943 9093 9098 9089 9281 9318 9253 9502 9591 
Geothermal EGS 10493 12083 12738 10346 12982 14161 10056 13589 15341 10007 13604 15430 10007 13604 15430 
Geothermal HSA 6984 7942 8338 6935 8574 9310 6783 9011 10123 6761 9037 10200 6761 9037 10200 
ISCC 2272 2302 2308 2204 2235 2236 2171 2205 2206 2162 2204 2212 2160 2214 2235 
OCGT 862 868 867 848 855 852 849 856 858 860 873 874 872 890 897 
Pumped Hydro 3161 3259 3275 3165 3270 3282 3305 3317 3191 3233 3359 3376 3410 3434 3270 
CCGT 1214 1230 1234 1199 1216 1217 1200 1219 1221 1212 1236 1242 1224 1255 1266 
CCGT CCS 3205 3240 3243 3155 3193 3189 3157 3198 3201 3193 3253 3262 3230 3310 3339 
Coal SC 2998 3057 3071 2929 2989 2998 2894 2958 2967 2881 2955 2970 2875 2962 2989 
Coal SC CCS 5407 5527 5553 5280 5403 5420 5211 5343 5359 5180 5329 5358 5165 5336 5384 
Wind 2791 2816 2817 2757 2779 2786 2747 2768 2776 2818 2868 2873 2872 2940 2964 
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Figure 16: Technology Costs for Conventional Electricity Generation 
 
Figure 17: Technology Costs for Renewable Electricity Generation 
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5.7 Initial Modelling Results 
This first set of results (Scenario 1a) provides us with an initial wholesale and market 
formation results surrounding the dynamic interplay between input fuel prices and their pass 
through. While policy imperatives are implemented with the minimum generation target of 
33TWh for renewables are more than met by this version of the “Set and Forget” case [50], 
there are some other interesting aspects to consider.  
As previously discussed, this scenario is somewhat similar in its assumptions and 
implementation, it will purposefully diverge from those presented by the CFGC in that 
renewable energy deployment and generation is hampered by prevailing long term gas prices. 
A LNG-glut [146] has grasped the worlds floating gas market and structural change is 
imminent. The suppressed LNG price and its linkage via the Japanese (CiF) market could 
have a noticeably significant effect on the viability of renewables within the foreseeable 
future.  
While this projection of input fuel prices may have led to the suppression new solar and wind 
generation capacity, the likelihood of this type of structural change continuing over the life of 
the full projection is low. Furthermore, it should also be noted that while LNG and as a 
consequence the post-export linked Australian domestic gas prices are lower than had 
previously been foreseen, the volatility of gas prices is quite likely to continue.  
5.7.1 Wholesale market spot prices 
The spot market prices observed via out modelling frame present a significant uplift in 
wholesale price on top of the expected increase due to carbon pricing. Although, the explicit 
removal of a fixed carbon price has been implemented via a shift in Australian government 
policy, its inclusion post 2020 given the expectation of global action has been assumed. The 
spot prices observed in Figure 18, represent a four-fold increase in regional prices by 
comparison to similar modelling undertaken by the CFGC. This is largely attributed to shifts 
in government climate change and renewable energy policy since 2013 [147]. 
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Figure 18: Yearly wholesale electricity market spot prices (Load Weighted Average) 
5.7.2 Generation Profile 
The presence of a somewhat altered renewable energy target and the removal of forced 
retirements in the electricity market for older and less efficient units in the generation fleet 
also produce alarming results. It is fairly evident, as demonstrated by the results presented in 
Figure 19 that the continued presence of combustive generation types reliant on black coal 
are still producing more than 50% (see Figure 20) of the required sent out energy in the 
NEM. Similarly, the retirement of brown coal generation assets during the modelling period 
is seen to be modest and the introduction of low carbon prices following 2020 is ineffectual 
in reducing their influence on the NEM. It should also be noted that all invested in new gas 
generation plant within this initial set of modelling results has been exclusively OCGT. This 
is almost exclusively due to the expected high degree of uncertainty surrounding natural gas 
prices (as discussed above). However, changing global oil price conditions have in fact 
severely suppressed the gas prices presented previously and change the likely mix of 
investment in generation.  
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Figure 19: Installed Capacity by technology type for Scenario 1 
The presence of “Installed” capacity for renewable energy generation is expected to comprise 
in excess of 30% of all installed generation capacity on the NEM by 2045 (see Figure 21). 
While each technology type has varying rates of availability, the presence/deployment of 
renewable generation would indicate that this is only a marginal increase of these 
technologies post 2016 levels.  
While installed capacity would seem to make a somewhat of an impact, the rate of dispatch 
and availability as a percentage of total generation, is unlikely to rise above 20% (see Figure 
22). We have also included a black line on the aforementioned figure as an indication of how 
the new target of 33TWh/year would appear contribute to overall moderate demand by 2045.  
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Figure 20: Generation profile by technology type for Scenario 1 
A marginal change in yearly renewable installed capacity is barely enough to change the rate 
of carbon emissions (see Figure 23). Furthermore, as seen in this figure, the emissions 
intensity factor (EIF, tonnes of CO2 emitted per MWh), converges towards the estimated EIF 
of 0.82tCO2 over the period 2045 it regains its momentum upwards toward 0.85. The 
emissions constraint of 0.65tCO2 is the estimated requirement to reduce atmospheric carbon 
levels from the Australian stationary energy industry [148]. 
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Figure 21: Installed Generation Capacity with respect to technological share 
 
Figure 22: Generation Dispatch Quantities with respect to Conventional and Renewable Technologies 
 
  64 
 
 
Figure 23: Carbon Emissions due to combustion in Scenario 1 
 
5.7.3 Concluding remarks 
While these results do highlight some interesting consequences for the Australian electricity 
sector, it should not be misinterpreted to reveal a likely outcome. The significant increase in 
global natural gas exploration and production have and will continue supress prices while in 
the long term lead to consolidation. Certainly this change in ownership of resources and their 
optimal extraction and expansion will be retimed within each producer’s greater global 
portfolio. Moreover, the most likely outcome is that withholding of capacity will be a result 
of this immediate glut of cheap supplies.  
The consequences for the electricity sector in Australia are that the volatility of world LNG 
prices will present other issues surrounding the availability of supply. In this case, we are 
more likely to see rapid spikes in prices that are induced by capacity transferal between the 
super majors of Oil. However, it is certainly of interest to note that the willingness to deploy 
renewable energy technology into the national market will be tested by such low input prices 
of production.  
 
 
  65 
 
6 Bibliography 
1. Joskow, P.L., Lessons learned from electricity market liberalization. The Energy 
Journal, 2008. 29(2): p. 9-42. 
2. Newbery, D.M., Problems of liberalising the electricity industry. European Economic 
Review, 2002. 46(4): p. 919-927. 
3. MacGill, I., H. Outhred, and K. Nolles, Some design lessons from market-based 
greenhouse gas regulation in the restructured Australian electricity industry. Energy 
Policy, 2006. 34(1): p. 11-25. 
4. Simshauser, P., Microeconomic reform of wholesale power markets : a dynamic 
partial equilibrium analysis of the impact of restructuring and deregulation in 
Queensland, in School of Economics. 2002, The University of Queensland: Brisbane. 
5. Joskow, P.L., Markets for power in the United States: An interim assessment. AEI-
Brookings Joint Center Working Paper, 2005(05-20). 
6. Kirschen, D.S., Demand-side view of electricity markets. Power Systems, IEEE 
Transactions on, 2003. 18(2): p. 520-527. 
7. Lal, D., The political economy of economic liberalization. The World Bank Economic 
Review, 1987. 1(2): p. 273-299. 
8. Ehrenmann, A. and K. Neuhoff, A comparison of electricity market designs in 
networks. Operations research, 2009. 57(2): p. 274-286. 
9. Bjørkvoll, T., et al. Power generation planning and risk management in a liberalised 
market. in Power Tech Proceedings, 2001 IEEE Porto. 2001. IEEE. 
10. Steiner, F., Regulation, industry structure, and performance in the electricity supply 
industry. Available at SSRN 223648, 2000. 
11. Jamasb, T. and M. Pollitt, Liberalisation and R&D in network industries: The case of 
the electricity industry. Research Policy, 2008. 37(6): p. 995-1008. 
12. Neuhoff, K., Large-Scale Deployment of Renewables for Electricity Generation. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2005. 21(1): p. 88-110. 
13. Hammond, G.P. and J. Spargo, The prospects for coal-fired power plants with carbon 
capture and storage: A UK perspective. Energy Conversion and Management, 2014. 
86: p. 476-489. 
14. Jamasb, T. and M. Pollitt, Electricity market reform in the European Union: review of 
progress toward liberalization & integration. The Energy Journal, 2005: p. 11-41. 
  66 
 
15. Sims, R.E., H.-H. Rogner, and K. Gregory, Carbon emission and mitigation cost 
comparisons between fossil fuel, nuclear and renewable energy resources for 
electricity generation. Energy policy, 2003. 31(13): p. 1315-1326. 
16. Roques, F.A., D.M. Newbery, and W.J. Nuttall, Fuel mix diversification incentives in 
liberalized electricity markets: a mean–variance portfolio theory approach. Energy 
Economics, 2008. 30(4): p. 1831-1849. 
17. Gnansounou, E., Assessing the energy vulnerability: Case of industrialised countries. 
Energy Policy, 2008. 36(10): p. 3734-3744. 
18. Moura, P.S. and A.T. De Almeida, The role of demand-side management in the grid 
integration of wind power. Applied Energy, 2010. 87(8): p. 2581-2588. 
19. Kirschen, D.S., et al., Factoring the elasticity of demand in electricity prices. Power 
Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 2000. 15(2): p. 612-617. 
20. Lilley, W., et al., An economic evaluation of the potential for distributed energy in 
Australia. Energy Policy, 2012. 51(1): p. 277–289. 
21. Mahon, P.J., et al., Measurement and modelling of the high-power performance of 
carbon-based supercapacitors. Journal of power sources, 2000. 91(1): p. 68-76. 
22. Paoli, C., P. Vassallo, and M. Fabiano, Solar power: an approach to transformity 
evaluation. Ecological engineering, 2008. 34(3): p. 191-206. 
23. Benini, M., et al. Day-ahead market price volatility analysis in deregulated electricity 
markets. in Power engineering Society Summer Meeting, 2002 IEEE. 2002. IEEE. 
24. Kim, J.-H. and A. Shcherbakova, Common failures of demand response. Energy, 
2011. 36(2): p. 873-880. 
25. Roques, F.A., Market design for generation adequacy: Healing causes rather than 
symptoms. Utilities Policy, 2008. 16(3): p. 171-183. 
26. Joskow, P., Supply security in competitive electricity and natural gas markets. 
Cambridge, MA, Paper prepared for the Beesley Lecture in London on October, 2005. 
25: p. 2005. 
27. Siano, P., Demand response and smart grids—A survey. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 2014. 30: p. 461-478. 
28. Castro-Rodriguez, F., P.L. Marín, and G. Siotis, Capacity choices in liberalised 
electricity markets. Energy Policy, 2009. 37(7): p. 2574-2581. 
29. Lise, W., B.F. Hobbs, and S. Hers, Market power in the European electricity 
market—the impacts of dry weather and additional transmission capacity. Energy 
Policy, 2008. 36(4): p. 1331-1343. 
  67 
 
30. Vazquez, C., M. Rivier, and I.J. Pérez-Arriaga, A market approach to long-term 
security of supply. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 2002. 17(2): p. 349-357. 
31. Zio, E. and T. Aven, Uncertainties in smart grids behavior and modeling: What are 
the risks and vulnerabilities? How to analyze them? Energy Policy, 2011. 39(10): p. 
6308-6320. 
32. Kazerooni, A.K. and J. Mutale, Transmission network planning under security and 
environmental constraints. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 2010. 25(2): p. 
1169-1178. 
33. Conejo, A.J., M. Carrión, and J.M. Morales, Decision making under uncertainty in 
electricity markets. Vol. 1. 2010: Springer. 
34. Roh, J.H., M. Shahidehpour, and L. Wu, Market-based generation and transmission 
planning with uncertainties. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 2009. 24(3): p. 
1587-1598. 
35. Leong, K. and R. Siddiqi, Value at risk for power markets. Energy Risk Management. 
New York, 1998: p. 157-178. 
36. Eydeland, A. and K. Wolyniec, Energy and power risk management. John Whiley and 
Sons, 2003. 
37. Dueñas, P., J. Barquín, and J. Reneses, Strategic management of multi-year natural 
gas contracts in electricity markets. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 2012. 
27(2): p. 771-779. 
38. Exemplar, E., Plexos: Leading the field in power market modelling. 2015, Retrieved 
01/2/2015, from http://www.energyexemplar.com. 
39. Mills, G. and I. MacGill, Potential power system and fuel consumption impacts of 
plug in hybrid vehicle charging using Australian National Electricity Market load 
profiles and transportation survey data. Electric Power Systems Research, 2014. 116: 
p. 1-11. 
40. Mills, G. and I.F. MacGill, Assessing the Generation Capacity, Energy, and GHG 
Emission Reduction Value of Public Electric Vehicle Recharging Infrastructure in the 
Australian National Electricity Market, in Electric Vehicle Conference (IEVC), 2014 
IEEE International. 2014, IEEE: Florence. p. 1 - 7. 
41. Denny, E. and M. O’Malley, The impact of carbon prices on generation-cycling costs. 
Energy Policy, 2009. 37(4): p. 1204-1212. 
42. AEMO, 2014 National Transmission Network Development Plan (NTNDP), A.E.M. 
Operator, Editor. 2014, AEMO, Australian Energy Market Operator: Australia. 
  68 
 
43. Australian-Government, Energy White Paper 2012, E.a.T. Department of Resources, 
Editor. 2012: Canberra, ACT. 
44. Australian-Government. Financing clean technologies 2012  [cited 2013 3/2/2013]; 
Available from: http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/clean-energy-future/our-
plan/clean-energy-australia/financing-clean-technologies/. 
45. Foster, J., et al., Delivering a competitive Australian power system Part 2: The 
challenges, the scenarios. 2013, School of Economics, University of Queensland, 
Australia. 
46. Molyneaux, L., et al., Australian power: Can renewable technologies change the 
dominant industry view? Renewable Energy, 2013. 60: p. 215-221. 
47. Wagner, L., L. Molyneaux, and J. Foster, The magnitude of the impact of a shift from 
coal to gas under a Carbon Price. Energy Policy, 2014. 66: p. 280-291. 
48. AEMO, 2012 Electricity Statement of Opportunities for the National Electricity 
Market, A.E.M. Operator, Editor. 2012, AEMO, Australian Energy Market Operator: 
Australia. 
49. AEMO, 2013 Electricity Statement of Opportunities for the National Electricity 
Market, A.E.M. Operator, Editor. 2013, AEMO, Australian Energy Market Operator: 
Australia. 
50. Graham, P., Brinsmead, T., Dunstall, S., Ward, J., Reedman, L., Elgindy, T., Gilmore, 
J.*, Cutler, N.*, James, G., Rai, A., and Hayward, J. , Modelling the Future Grid 
Forum scenarios. 2013, CSIRO: Newcastle, NSW, Australia. 
51. Vickrey, W., Auctions and bidding games. Recent advances in game theory, 1962. 29: 
p. 15-27. 
52. Frahm, D.G. and L.F. Schrader, An experimental comparison of pricing in two 
auction systems. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1970. 52(4): p. 528-
534. 
53. Bower, J. and D. Bunn, Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price 
versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market. Journal 
of economic dynamics and control, 2001. 25(3): p. 561-592. 
54. David, A.K. and F. Wen. Strategic bidding in competitive electricity markets: a 
literature survey. in Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, 2000. IEEE. 2000. 
IEEE. 
55. Wagner, L. and L. Reedman. Modeling the deployment of plug-in hybrid and electric 
vehicles and their effects on the Australian National Electricity Market. in Innovative 
  69 
 
Technologies for an Efficient and Reliable Electricity Supply (CITRES), 2010 IEEE 
Conference on. 2010. IEEE. 
56. AEMO. Electricity Market Data. 2014  [cited 2014 November 2014]; Available from: 
http://www.aemo.com.au/Electricity/Data. 
57. Acil Tasman, Fuel resource, new entry and generation costs in the NEM: Final 
Report 9, in Report prepared by ACIL Tasman for the Interregional Planning 
Committee (IRPC). 2009. 
58. BREE, Australian energy technology assessment 2012, B.o.R.a.E. Economics, Editor. 
2012, Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics: Canberra, ACT. 
59. BREE, Australian energy technology assessment 2013, B.o.R.a.E. Economics, Editor. 
2013, Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics: Canberra, ACT. 
60. AEMO, W., Cost of ConstructionNew Generation Technology. 2012, AUSTRALIAN 
ENERGY MARKET OPERATOR: Melbourne. 
61. AEMO, Rooftop PV Information Paper, National Electricity Forecasting. 2012, 
Australian Electricity Market Operator: Australia. 
62. AEMO. Maps and Multimedia. 2013  1/10/2013]; Available from: 
http://www.aemo.com.au/Maps-and-Multimedia. 
63. AER, State of the Energy Market: 2014. 2014. 
64. CSIRO, Intelligent Grid: A value proposition for wide scale distributed energy 
solutions in Australia 2009: Australia. 
65. CSIRO, Unlocking Australia's Energy Potential. 2011, CSIRO - National Research 
Flagships, Energy Transformed Australia. 
66. Acil Tasman, Economic significance of Coal Seam Gas in Queensland, in Australian 
Petroleum Production & Exploration Association. 2012. 
67. BREE, Australian energy statistics: energy update 2012, B.o.R.a.E. Economics, 
Editor. 2012: BREE, Canberra. 
68. IGU, World LNG Report-2011. 2012, International Gas Union, Oslo, Norway. 
69. Simshauser, P. and P. Wild, THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN POWER DILEMMA*. 
Australian Economic Papers, 2009. 48(4): p. 342-369. 
70. Ball, B., et al., Delivering a Competitive Australian Power System. Part 1: Australia’s 
Global Position. 2011, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia. 
71. BREE, Gas Market Report 2013, BREE, Editor. 2012, Department of Industry, 
Commonwealth of Australia. 
  70 
 
72. Brown, S.P. and M.K. Yücel, Market arbitrage: European and North American 
natural gas prices. The Energy Journal, 2009: p. 167-185. 
73. Che, T.N. and T. Kompas, The Structure and Dynamics of Liquefied Natural Gas 
Pricing in Asia and the Pacific and Implications for Australia. Crawford School 
Public Policy ANU, The Structure and Dynamics of Liquefied Natural Gas Pricing in 
Asia and the Pacific and Implications for Australia (November 5, 2014), 2014. 
74. Che, T.N. and T. Kompas, Economic Analysis of the Effects of Eastern Australia's 
LNG Exports in Asia-Pacific on Domestic Gas Users. Economic Analysis of the 
Effects of Eastern Australia's LNG Exports in Asia-Pacific on Domestic Gas Users 
(November 9, 2014), 2014. 
75. Electricity Act 1994, in Chapter 5A. 1994: Queensland, Australia. 
76. Government, Q. Queensland Gas Electricity Scheme. 2014  [cited 2014 18 November 
2014]; Available from: 
https://www.business.qld.gov.au/industry/energy/gas/queensland-gas-scheme. 
77. Chyong, C.K. and B.F. Hobbs, Strategic Eurasian natural gas market model for 
energy security and policy analysis: Formulation and application to South Stream. 
Energy Economics, 2014. 44: p. 198-211. 
78. Wagner, L., ATESHGAH: A Mixed Complementarity model of the Eastern Australian 
Domestic Natural Gas Market. Energy Economics and Management Group, Working 
paper Series, 2014. 
79. Wagner, L. Modelling the Australian Domestic Gas Market: A Mixed 
Complementarity approach with Oligopolistic Behaviour'. in IAEE Conference. 2014. 
New York, USA. 
80. Harker, P.T., Alternative models of spatial competition. Operations Research, 1986. 
34(3): p. 410-425. 
81. Harker, P.T. and J.-S. Pang, Finite-dimensional variational inequality and nonlinear 
complementarity problems: a survey of theory, algorithms and applications. 
Mathematical programming, 1990. 48(1-3): p. 161-220. 
82. Hecking, H. and T. Panke, COLUMBUS-a global gas market model. 2012, EWI 
Working Paper. 
83. Egging, R.G. and S.A. Gabriel, Examining market power in the European natural gas 
market. Energy Policy, 2006. 34(17): p. 2762-2778. 
84. Holz, F., C. von Hirschhausen, and C. Kemfert, A strategic model of European gas 
supply (GASMOD). Energy Economics, 2008. 30(3): p. 766-788. 
  71 
 
85. Abada, I., et al., A generalized Nash–Cournot model for the northwestern European 
natural gas markets with a fuel substitution demand function: The GaMMES model. 
Networks and Spatial Economics, 2013. 13(1): p. 1-42. 
86. Gabriel, S.A., et al., Cartelization in gas markets: Studying the potential for a “Gas 
OPEC”. Energy Economics, 2012. 34(1): p. 137-152. 
87. Gabriel, S. and Y. Smeers, Complementarity problems in restructured natural gas 
markets. 2006: Springer. 
88. Rutherford, T.F., Extension of GAMS for complementarity problems arising in 
applied economic analysis. Journal of Economic Dynamics and control, 1995. 19(8): 
p. 1299-1324. 
89. Ferris, M.C. and T.S. Munson, Interfaces to PATH 3.0: Design, implementation and 
usage. Computational Optimization and Applications, 1999. 12(1-3): p. 207-227. 
90. Ferris, M.C. and T.S. Munson, Complementarity problems in GAMS and the PATH 
solver. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2000. 24(2): p. 165-188. 
91. Egging, R., et al., A complementarity model for the European natural gas market. 
Energy policy, 2008. 36(7): p. 2385-2414. 
92. Hartley, P. and K.B. Medlock, The Baker Institute world gas trade model. Natural gas 
and geopolitics: from, 2006: p. 357-406. 
93. Boots, M.G., F.A. Rijkers, and B.F. Hobbs, Trading in the downstream European gas 
market: a successive oligopoly approach. The Energy Journal, 2004: p. 73-102. 
94. Neumann, A., Linking natural gas markets-is lng doing its job? 2008. 
95. Gabriel, S.A., J. Zhuang, and S. Kiet, A large-scale linear complementarity model of 
the North American natural gas market. Energy economics, 2005. 27(4): p. 639-665. 
96. Copeland, A., Grafton, Q., Hitchins, N., and Syed, A, BREE Gas Market Report 2012, 
E.a.T. Department of Resources, Editor. 2012, Commonwealth of Australia: 
Canberra. 
97. BREE, G.A., Australian Gas Resource Assessment 2012. Canberra: Geoscience 
Australian and Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics, 2012. 
98. AEMO. Gas Bulletin Board, 2014. 2014  [cited 2014 22 November 2014]; Available 
from: http://www.aemo.com.au/Gas/Market-Data. 
99. AEMO, 2012 Gas Statement of Opportunities for the National Electricity Market, 
A.E.M. Operator, Editor. 2012, AEMO, Australian Energy Market Operator: 
Australia. 
  72 
 
100. AEMO, 2013 Gas Statement of Opportunities for the National Electricity Market, 
A.E.M. Operator, Editor. 2013, AEMO, Australian Energy Market Operator: 
Australia. 
101. Energy, C., Gas Transmission Costs, in Prepared for the Australian Energy Market 
Operator. 2012. 
102. Energy, C., Eastern and Southern Australia Projected Gas Reserves Updated, in 
Prepared for the Australian Energy Market Operator. 2012. 
103. Energy, C., Current and Projected Gas Reserves and Resources for Eastern and 
South Eastern Australia, in Prepared for the Australian Energy Market Operator. 
2013. 
104. AGL. AGL annual reserves report 2013. 2013  August 2013]; Available from: 
http://www.agl.com.au/~/media/AGL. 
105. Metgasco. Metgasco Setpember 2013 quarterly activity report. 2013  [cited 2014 
10/7/2014]; Available from: http://www.metgasco.com.au/asx-announcements/. 
106. Mines, D.o.N.R.a. Coal seam gas production and reserve statistics. 2014  [cited 2015 
25/05/2015]; Available from: https://data.qld.gov.au/dataset/coal-seam-gas-
production-and-reserve-statistics. 
107. Mines, D.o.N.R.a. Natural gas production and reserves statistics. 2014  [cited 2015 
25/05/2015]; Available from: https://data.qld.gov.au/dataset/natural-gas-production-
and-reserves-statistics. 
108. Golombek, R., E. Gjelsvik, and K.E. Rosendahl, Effects of liberalizing the natural gas 
markets in Western Europe. The Energy Journal, 1995: p. 85-111. 
109. Hartley, P.R. and K.B. Medlock III, Potential futures for Russian natural gas exports. 
The Energy Journal, 2009: p. 73-95. 
110. André, J. Optimization of investments in gas networks. 2010. Université du Littoral 
Côte d'Opale. 
111. Simshauser, P., T. Nelson, and T. Doan, The Boomerang Paradox, part I: How a 
nation's wealth is creating fuel poverty. The Electricity Journal, 2011. 24(1): p. 72-91. 
112. Stoft, S., Power Systems Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity. 2002: IEEE 
Press & Wiley-Interscience. 
113. Tusiani, M.D. and G. Shearer, LNG: a Nontechnical Guide. 2007: PennWell Books. 
114. Wagner, L. and J. Foster, Is There an Optimal Entry Time for Carbon Capture and 
Storage? A Case Study for Australia's National Electricity Market. 2011, School of 
Economics, University of Queensland, Australia. 
  73 
 
115. Midthun, K.T., M. Bjørndal, and A. Tomasgard, Modeling optimal economic dispatch 
and system effects in natural gas networks. The Energy Journal, 2009: p. 155-180. 
116. Monitz, E., The Future of Natural Gas. An Interdisciplinary MIT Study. Interim 
Report. 2010, Cambridg (MA), MIT. 
117. Pindyck, R.S., The structure of world energy demand. MIT Press Books, 1979. 1. 
118. Schreider, S., et al., Sensitivity analysis of gas supply optimization models. Annals of 
Operations Research, 2014: p. 1-24. 
119. Al-Sahlawi, M.A., The demand for natural gas: a survey of price and income 
elasticities. The Energy Journal, 1989: p. 77-90. 
120. Estrada, J. and O. Fugleberg, Price elasticities of natural gas demand in France and 
West Germany. The Energy Journal, 1989: p. 77-90. 
121. EIA, International Energy Outlook. US Energy Information Administration. 2013, 
DOE/EIA-0484 (2013) Edition. 
122. Godet, M. and F. Roubelat, Creating the future: the use and misuse of scenarios. 
Long range planning, 1996. 29(2): p. 164-171. 
123. Chermack, T., S. Lynham, and W. Ruona, A review of scenario planning literature. 
Futures Research Quarterly, 2001. 17(2). 
124. Morrison-Saunders, A. and J. Pope, Conceptualising and managing trade-offs in 
sustainability assessment. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 2013. 38(0): p. 
54-63. 
125. Kahn, H. and R. Aron, Thinking about the Unthinkable. 1962: Horizon Press New 
York. 
126. Fligstein, N. and D. McAdam, Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action Fields. 
Sociological Theory, 2011. 29(1): p. 1-26. 
127. Wohlstetter, R., A.W. Marshall, and J.J. Martin, On not confusing ourselves: essays 
on national security strategy in honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter. 1991: 
Westview Pr. 
128. Kahn, H.M., Irwin, War Gaming. 1957, The RAND Corporation: Santa Monica. p. 
14. 
129. Foster, J.L., Ariel; Wagner, Liam, Deliverable 2a: The Scenarios. 2014, University of 
Queensland: Brisbane. p. 14. 
130. Foster, J.L., Ariel; Wagner, Liam, Deliverable 3: Cluster Scenarios and Relationship 
with the CSIRO Future Grid Forum. 2014, University of Queensland: Brisbane. p. 14. 
131. Kahn, H., On thermonuclear war. 2007: Transaction publishers. 
  74 
 
132. Kahn, H. and A.J. Wiener, The next thirty-three years: a framework for speculation. 
Daedalus, 1967: p. 705-732. 
133. AEMO, 2012 National Transmission Network Development Plan (NTNDP), A.E.M. 
Operator, Editor. 2012, AEMO, Australian Energy Market Operator: Australia. 
134. Sciences, A.A.o.T., Engineering, and J. Burgess, Low-carbon Energy: Evaluation of 
New Energy Technology Choices for Electric Power Generation in Australia: Report 
of a Study by the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering 
(ATSE). 2010: Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering. 
135. Beck, V., et al., Opportunities for low-carbon energy technologies for electricity 
generation to 2050. 2013, International Council of Academies of Engineering and 
Technological Sciences Virginia, USA. 
136. Foster, J., L. Wagner, and A. Bratanova, LCOE models: A comparison of the 
theoretical frameworks and key assumptions. 2014, University of Queensland, 
Australia: Brisbane, Australia. 
137. Ball, B., et al., Delivering a competitive Australian power system Part 1: Australia’s 
Global Position. 2011. 
138. AEMO. Regulatory Investment Tests for Transmission (RIT-Ts). 2014  [cited 2015 
01/05/2015]; Available from: 
http://www.aemo.com.au/Electricity/Planning/Regulatory-Investment-Tests-for-
Transmission/. 
139. Morrison, G., Energy efficiency standards and innovation. Environmental Research 
Letters, 2015. 10(1): p. 011001. 
140. Gerarden, T.D., et al., An assessment of the energy-efficiency gap and its implications 
for climate-change policy. 2015, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
141. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2014 Power Generation Investment Assumptions. 2014, 
International Energy Agency: Paris. 
142. CSIRO, TNEP Assumptions and Data. 2013. 
143. Froome, C., L.D. Wagner, and J. Foster, Energy Storage Technology Options for 
Distribution Networks - More Than Just the Economic Cost, in US Association of 
Energy Economics. 2013, USAEE: Anchorage, Alaska. 
144. AEMO, Gas Market Operations. 2015, Australian Energy Market Operator: 
Melbourne. 
145. Wagner, L., Woodside’s failed Papua New Guinea power play shows the growing 
desperation in the gas sector. 2015. 
  75 
 
146. Daiss, T. LNG Supply Glut Changes The Rules Of The Game: Buyers Will Have A 
Much A Stronger Hand. Forbes Energy 2016; Available from: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/02/17/lng-supply-glut-changes-the-rules-
of-the-game-buyers-will-have-a-much-a-stronger-hand/#189f28b43bb6. 
147. Byrnes, L., et al., Australian renewable energy policy: Barriers and challenges. 
Renewable Energy, 2013. 60(0): p. 711-721. 
148. Wagner, L.D., et al., Forecasting the long term emissions intensity factor for 
electricity markets: an Australian case study, in 10th IAEE European Conference. 
2009, IAEE: Vienna, Austria. 
